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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la experiencia chilena de los años noventa con el uso de controles de capital.
En particular, usando datos contables para un grupo de 73 empresas durante 1986-2001, el trabajo
mide los efectos del encaje a los flujos de capital sobre la estructura y el costo de financiamiento de
las empresas. Este trabajo es el primer intento por medir directamente algunos de los costos
microeconómicos del encaje que rigió en Chile entre 1991 y 1998. Para efectos del análisis las
empresas se agrupan por sector económico, tamaño y grado de acceso a los mercados de capitales
externos. Los resultados muestran que los efectos del encaje son específicos a cada firma y, por
ejemplo, hay marcadas diferencias en cómo las empresas de distinto tamaño y con o sin acceso a
los mercados externos de crédito respondieron a la imposición del encaje.
Abstract
This paper studies the experience with the use of capital controls in Chile during the 1990s. Rather
than revisiting previous studies, it complements previous research by providing, for the first time,
empirical evidence on some of the microeconomic effects of capital controls, in particular, the
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR). By looking at financial statements for a group of 73
Chilean firms during 1986-2001, the paper attempts to identify the effects of the URR on the firms’
costs and ways of financing. Chilean firms are grouped by economic sector, size and access to
international capital markets. Results show that the effects of the URR are firm specific; for
instance, there are striking differences in the response to the URR among firms of different size and
those with or without access to international capital markets.
____________________
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1. Introduction
Facing a surge in private capital inflows in the early 1990s, which made the trade-off
between different macroeconomic objectives increasingly difficult and costly, the Chilean
authorities established in 1991 capital controls in the form of a reserve requirement on
some types of inflows.
1 The reserve requirement obliged capital importers to put a fraction
of the inflow in the Central Bank in a deposit bearing no interest –i.e., it constituted a tax
on selective capital inflows. By introducing a wedge between domestic and foreign interest
rates, this policy was seeking to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in the control
of both domestic inflation and the size of the current account deficit, without necessarily
forcing the central bank to give up exchange rate policy.
Chile’s most recent experience with capital controls
2 –of both the administrative and
quantitative sort
3– has caught the interest of policymakers and academic economists in a
world of highly volatile capital flows, especially since Mexico’s crisis in 1994-95. Indeed,
several world class economists –most notoriously Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz– praised
the controls after the Mexican and Asian crises. Concurrently, an increasing number of
recent studies –summarized in section 2– have provided an empirical evaluation of the
consequences of Chile’s quantitative restrictions on capital inflows. But all of these studies
have looked into the effects of the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on
macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange rate, the differential between domestic
and foreign interest rates, and the composition of capital inflows. Although some studies
have mentioned the possible microeconomic effects of this policy-introduced distortion, so
far no one has attempted to directly measure such effects
4.
This paper attempts to fill in this gap by directly measuring the effects of the capital
controls in effect in Chile between 1991 and 1998, on the way firms finance their
operations and on their cost of capital. The analysis is carried out by looking at balance
sheet data for a group of 73 Chilean firms during the 1986-2001 period. This sixteen year
period is long enough to comprise the post-debt crisis years (when Chile had restricted
access to private capital flows), the years when emerging market economies had relatively
unhindered access to foreign capital, and the years after the Asian crisis when private
capital became scarcer. Before proceeding we should note that this is the first attempt to
directly measure some of the microeconomic effects of the capital controls in Chile during
the 1990s. As such, instead of challenging previous results, we use them –and the data
                                                                
1 The policy objectives were the control of both domestic inflation and the size of the current account
deficit, while maintaining the real value of the currency. Although sterilized intervention was an
alternative that was extensively used by Chile as well as other capital inflow recipient countries, it was an
increasingly costly policy.
2 Chile has a long history of controls on capital account transactions, starting in the 1930s and continuing
through the mid-1970s. Then, controls were gradually liberalized in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but
were tightened again in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s.
3 As discussed in section 3 below, during this period the Central Bank also modified several other
administrative controls affecting both capital inflows and outflows.
4 Edwards (1999) and Gallego et al. (2002) mention some potential microeconomic costs and, only recently,
Forbes (2002) assesses some of its effects indirectly by comparing the extent of financial constraints faced
by firms before, during and after the URR.2
constructed in previous research– when formulating and testing the hypotheses that we are
interested in.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the
recent empirical literature on capital controls in Chile. Section 3 provides a brief
description of the main features of the capital controls in effect in Chile during the 1990s.
This description is needed because of our extensive use in subsequent sections of indices
measuring the extent and severity of the different controls on both inflows and outflows
5.
Section 4 provides details on data sources, sample composition, the equations to be
estimated and on the econometric procedures used. Finally, section 5 presents the results of
our analysis, while section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. Literature review 
6
The URR was established in Chile in 1991, as a response to the surge in capital
inflows toward emerging market economies that exerted upward pressure on the real
exchange rate and created symptoms of overheating. By imposing a reserve requirement on
selective capital inflows, the Central Bank aimed to enhance the effectiveness of monetary
policy –i.e., to be able to raise interest rate to abate domestic demand and contain
inflationary pressures– while, at the same time, supporting the nominal exchange rate
(avoid an appreciation) and reducing the vulnerability resulting from the build up of
speculative short-term flows.
7
Chile’s controls on capital inflows have been studied extensively, but most of the
literature focuses on their macroeconomic consequences
8. This has been partly because of
the rationale advanced by the Chilean authorities when imposing the controls and partly
because of the difficulties that exist in analyzing empirically their microeconomic effects.
Thus, most of the existing literature has focused on answering the following four related
questions which, as mentioned, are directly related to the policy objectives pursued by the
Central Bank of Chile when imposing the URR in June 1991 (and maintaining it through
September 1998):
1.  Has the URR raised the effectiveness of monetary policy, under conditions of limited
exchange rate flexibility? 
9
2.  Has the URR contributed to a more depreciated real exchange rate?
3.  Has the URR reduced total capital inflows or changed their composition from short-
term (or financial) to long-term inflows (or non-financial)?
4.  And, in the context of the 1997-1999 international turmoil, has the URR diminished
contagion from international shocks to the Chilean economy?
                                                                
5 Some readers, especially those unfamiliar with the Chilean URR, may find it useful to take a quick look at
section 3 before reading section 2.
6 This section draws extensively on Gallego et al. (2002).
7 Without the reserve requirement an increase in domestic interest rates would lead to additional inflows
which, in turn, would tend to appreciate the nominal (and real) exchange rate.
8 As previously mentioned, the exception to the rule is Forbes (2002).
9 An exchange rate band was in place until September 1999, when a free float was adopted.3
The existing empirical research on the subject has addressed these questions adopting
a variety of econometric approaches that range from single-equation models (including
OLS, instrumental variable techniques and threshold models) to multi-equation models
(including vector auto-regressive –VAR– models and generalized auto-regressive
conditional heteroskedasticity –GARCH– models). The main findings from this literature
are the following:
2. A Single equation models (SEM)
The seminal paper by Soto and Valdés-Prieto (1996) concludes that the imposition of
the URR did not change the trend appreciation of the real exchange rate during the 1990s.
In this and two subsequent papers (Valdés-Prieto and Soto, 1998 and 2000), these authors
conclude that the URR did lead to a change on the composition of capital flows, reducing
the share of taxed short-term flows and raising the share of exempt flows.
10 Nevertheless,
total short-term flows were not affected by the URR.
Eyzaguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) reach a different conclusion regarding the
composition of capital inflows. They find that the URR did lead to a reduction of total
short-term flows, but did not have any statistically significant effect on total (short plus
long-term) flows. They also find that the URR increased the effectiveness of monetary
policy (by raising the wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates) and led to a
temporary real exchange rate depreciation, though these two effects are rather weak and not
robust to different specifications for the estimated equations.
Regarding the impact of capital controls on the effectiveness of monetary policy,
Edwards (1998) finds that during the post 1992-93 period, when the URR increased in
importance, the URR affected the degree of inertia of the interest rate differential but not its
level. Consequently, the author concludes that the URR did allow the Central Bank a higher
degree of policy autonomy although on a temporary basis.
Using a threshold model technique, Larraín et al. (2000) find that the URR had a
negative permanent effect on taxed short-term flows (operating through an increase in the
relevant interest rate differential), a positive transitory effect on exempt short-term flows,
and no effect on long-term flows. Summing up, their results indicate that the URR has a
non-linear, negative and significant effect both on short-term and total capital flows.
The main shortcomings of the preceding studies are that they do not control for
changes in other capital account regulations (namely, liberalization of capital outflows and
inflows) and for changes in the URR other than the tax rate (i.e., changes in coverage and
the presence of loopholes).
11
                                                                
10 Valdés-Prieto and Soto (2000) state that taxed flows could be associated with those that use legal channels
and have secure access to the inter-bank foreign exchange rate for the repatriation of principal and interest
or dividends.
11 For a critical review of the literature –without rigorous empirical analysis– see Nadal-De Simone and
Sorsa (1999).4
The paper by De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) overcomes some of these
limitations by including a new variable aimed at measuring the presence and extent of
loopholes (an index measuring the power of the URR). Using a SEM the authors conclude
that the URR provided the Central Bank with additional room to maneuver (i.e., it allowed
for a higher domestic interest rate) and changed the composition of inflows toward long-
term flows. However, like previous studies, they are still unable to find any significant
effect of the URR on the real exchange rate (RER).
More recently, Gallego et al. (2002) extends previous research by including not only
a measure of the presence and extent of loopholes in the URR (that is, its ineffectiveness),
but also indexes that control for the lifting of other capital account restrictions, such as
minimum periods of stay and mandatory remittances, among others. The authors conclude
that the URR loses effectiveness (or its power decreases) as time passes and investors
develop new ways to elude it. Like prior studies they find that by introducing a wedge
between domestic and foreign interest rates, the URR allowed the central bank to run a
more independent monetary policy, but this effect occurred mainly through changes in the
URR effectiveness or power (i.e., by closing loopholes) rather than by raising its tax rate.
Also acting through its power the URR affected negatively the amount of inflows received
by the country. Thus, the URR can be used neither to sustain an interest rate differential
with abroad nor to reduce the flow of capital to the country –all objectives seek by the
authorities– on a permanent basis (unless the authorities manage to permanently close all
loopholes). However, the URR did tilt the composition of flows toward long-term ones
permanently.
2. B System Models
The lack of response of the real exchange rate to changes in the URR presents a
puzzle, since the higher level for the domestic interest rate –supported by the URR– could
be expected to lead to a more depreciated real exchange rate through the expenditure
channel. The fact that this effect has not been found in the empirical papers based on SEMs
is likely due to misspecification problems. This is suggested by the results reported in two
studies that apply VARs, namely, Soto (1997), and De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés
(2000). These papers report that a temporary shock in the URR depreciates the real
exchange rate on a temporary basis.
12 Furthermore, Soto (1997) finds that increases in the
URR lead to a reduction in the volatility of the RER. The three papers using a VAR
approach (Soto 1997, Edwards 1999, and De Gregorio et al. 2000) also confirm previous
findings regarding the level of domestic interest rates, the composition of inflows, and the
absence of any significant and permanent effect on total flows.
Regarding the impact of the URR on the volatility of other macroeconomic prices,
Edwards (1999) estimates a GARCH model for the volatility of short-term central bank
nominal repo rates and the stock market (price) index. His results indicate that the URR has
a negative and significant effect only on the volatility of the stock market index. Finally,
Edwards (1999, 2000) analyzes if capital controls isolated Chilean interest rates from
                                                                
12 However, using a similar approach Edwards (1999) finds no effect of the URR on the real exchange rate.5
external shocks and concludes that the URR was not able to reduce contagion effects from
foreign interest rate shocks to domestic interest rates.
In sum, there is ample evidence showing that the URR led to higher domestic interest
rates –or a larger differential with international interest rates– and a change in the
composition of inflows, without affecting the real exchange rate. Yet the effect of the URR
on total flows remains controversial, with all studies but Larraín et al. (2000) finding no
significant permanent effect.
13
But a broad open question on the effects of Chile’s capital controls warrants
additional research, namely, what are their microeconomic consequences. No study so far
has reported direct evidence of the microeconomic effects of these controls, although a few
have identified some of their potential costs. Gallego et al. (1999) takes an indirect
approach and assesses some of the costs of the policy mix pursued by the Central Bank of
Chile during most of the 1990s –the authors claim that the policy mix was supported and to
a great extent possible because of introducing the URR. They argue that the country paid a
cost in terms of lower growth (because of the central bank keeping a higher interest rate
than it would have prevailed otherwise) and in terms of a transfer abroad (because of
financing the large stock of reserves that resulted from the sterilization of capital inflows).
In addition, the authors argue that there are microeconomic costs because of the inefficient
allocation of resources that results from investors trying to elude the tax –and the
authorities constantly uncovering and closing loopholes– and from some projects and firms
being discriminated against. Their claim was that the URR discriminated against short-term
projects that were more heavily taxed because of the way the URR was designed, and
against firms that could not substitute among different sources of finance (most likely small
firms highly dependent on bank financing). Similarly, Forbes (2002) compares the periods
before, during and after the URR and notices that small firms were more financially
constrained when the URR was in place. But she does not attempt to separate the direct
effect of the URR on firms’ financial decisions from other developments taking place at the
same time, namely, a restrictive monetary policy (i.e., sterilization of capital inflows) and
an increase in the demand for funds associated with a period of high economic growth and
good economic prospects.
The rest of the paper investigates the issue of the microeconomic effects of the URR,
controlling for other microeconomic and macroeconomic factors.
3. Capital controls in Chile during the 1990s 
14
The resumption of voluntary capital flows to emerging market economies led to a
new wave of inflows to Chile starting in 1988. After a growing tide of inflows during 1988-
90, the central bank imposed quantitative restrictions in the form of an unremunerated
reserve requirement (URR) on selective inflows (this restriction was imposed in 1991 and
                                                                
13 A more detailed summary of the research on this subject is presented in Gallego et al. (2002), Appendix
A.
14 See footnote 6.6
lasted through September 1998). At the same time, the Central Bank started to liberalize
existing administrative controls on capital outflows, and to lessen other quantitative and
administrative controls on inflows (see Gallego et al. (1999) for a detailed description of
these controls during this period).
In this section we summarize the specific restrictions on capital flows existing during
the 1990s and present measures of their extent. These measures are taken from Gallego et
al. (2002) and are presented here because of our extensively using them in the empirical
analysis.
3. A  Unremunerated Reserve Requirement
The URR is a requirement to hold an unremunerated fixed-term (mostly one-year)
reserve at the central bank, equivalent to a fraction of capital inflows in certain categories.
Hence, the URR is equivalent to a tax per unit of time that declines with the permanence or
maturity of the affected capital inflow. The quantitative nature of this restriction (that is, its
tax equivalence) is made more explicit by its alternative form: instead of actually
depositing the unremunerated reserve fraction with the central bank, foreign investors are
allowed to pay the central bank an up-front fee. The fee is determined by the product of the
relevant foreign interest rate and the fraction of capital subject to the restriction.
Various features of the URR were altered during its existence. The central bank
modified the required rate or fraction of deposit, the coverage of capital inflow categories
subject to it, the foreign currency denomination of the reserve deposit or fee payment, the
holding period, the restrictions on the rollover of maturing investments, and other
administrative requirements related to the URR.












where t is the fraction of the capital inflow required to be held as a deposit or reserve with
the central bank, h is the required holding period, k is the average maturity of the foreign
investment for which the URR is calculated (equal to six months in the empirical
estimations reported below), and i* is the equivalent foreign interest cost for a k-month
operation.
15
Measures of urr similar to that defined in equation (1) have been used in previous
empirical studies,
16 and these measures reflect both changes introduced by the central bank
                                                                
15 For details on the applicable i* see Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999).
16 These measures can be termed “naive” in the sense that they do not reflect the option value of reinvesting
or rolling over the capital after maturity (this option existed until 1996) as calculated by Herrera and
Valdés (2001).7
(affecting t, h/k, and the applicable i*) and changing market conditions (affecting i*). For
instance, t started at a rate of 20 percent in June 1991, was raised to 30 percent in May
1992, reduced to 10 percent in June 1998, and reduced to zero in September of that year
(figure 1). Other administrative changes introduced by the central bank altered the maturity
(h/k) and the relevant i*,
17 although the latter was also affected by changing market
conditions. The urr series that takes into account all these factors is depicted in figure 2 and
shows a trend increase until late 1997, largely explained by the rising share of up-front fee
payments.
18 From June 1991 through September 1998, urr averaged 4.24 percent a year,
with a standard deviation of 2.14 percent. Its maximum was 7.7 percent in November 1997.
As with any other tax, the URR provided an incentive for tax avoidance and tax
evasion.
19 Using different sources, Gallego et al. (2002) calculate the effectiveness or
power of the URR (this is estimated by the ratio between the flows actually taxed by the
URR and the total amount of flows that were potentially subject to it). Figure 2 reports the
monthly time series for the power index (pow). The latter suggests that the URR gained
effectiveness over time, although this happened because of the central bank’s continuing
effort to close loopholes in URR regulations. For instance, in January 1992, six months
after its introduction, the URR power index stood at 50 percent, mainly because of
extensive re-labeling of several forms of capital inflows as dollar-denominated deposits,
which were exempted from the URR. When these deposits became subject to the URR in
February 1992, the power index increased to 78 percent (although other loopholes were
discovered and used by arbitrageurs).
Combining the simple measure of the cost of the URR, urr, with its effectiveness or
power (pow) and the URR coverage (cov), allows one to obtain a measure of the effective
cost of the reserve requirement (err):
(2) err = urr * cov * pow
Figure 2 depicts the time pattern of urr and err (as well as that of pow). Both show a
rising trend until late 1997. The effective cost of the reserve requirement attained a sample
average of 3.84 percent and a standard deviation of 2.30 percent during 1991-98.
3. B  Other Restrictions to capital flows
The central bank largely liberalized administrative restrictions on both capital inflows
and outflows during the 1990s and abolished all remaining restrictions in April 2001. This
can be seen both as part of the country’s overall economic liberalization and financial
integration process and a (temporary) substitution of quantitative restrictions on inflows
(the URR) for administrative controls.
                                                                
17 The central bank changed from yen or dollar rates to dollar rates only in November 1994.
18 The fee option appears to be more expensive than depositing funds with the central bank, because of the
spread of 2.5 percent (or 4 percent) applied to it on top of the foreign interest rate i* (see Annex 2 in
Gallego et al. 1999).
19 Le Fort and Sanhueza (1997) provide a detailed description of the avoidance of the URR that was
observed in the 1990s.8
Regarding capital inflows, the two main quantitative restrictions –other than the
URR– are minimum solvency requirements on domestic issuers of foreign liabilities (bonds
and American depository receipts, or ADRs) and minimum size requirements on issues of
foreign liabilities by corporations and banks. Both restrictions were partly liberalized
during the last decade, as reflected in their liberalization index (acci) depicted in figure 1.
Minimum permanence requirements before repatriation of capital and profits may be
interpreted as restrictions on both capital inflows and outflows. Technically they affect
outflows of capital because they are imposed on capital that has entered at some point in
time; that is, they restrict the repatriation of principal and cumulative profits accrued on
past investments. However, in an ex ante sense they deter additional foreign investment,
and hence negatively affect (future) capital inflows (Labán and Larraín, 1997).
Permanence requirements on foreign investment –both portfolio and direct– were
reduced from an average of eight to three years in 1991, and further to two-and-a-half and
one years in 1992-93, before being completely eliminated in May 2000 (accr in figure 1).
This liberalization was implemented in an ex post way: existing foreign capital was allowed
to leave the country after complying with the new, shorter permanence requirement. For
this reason one may expect to observe larger capital outflows at the times when permanence
requirements were relaxed –as the central bank intended– and this is why we classify the
requirement as a capital outflow restriction.
Other regulations on capital outflows that were liberalized during the last decade
include ceilings on foreign asset holdings by domestic financial institutions and surrender
requirements imposed on export proceeds (both were abolished in July 1995). An aggregate
index for these and a host of other secondary administrative controls on outflows is
depicted as acco in figure 1.
The various indexes in figure 1 show significant and simultaneous progress in the
liberalization of both capital inflows and outflows largely concentrated during 1991-95.
This downward trend in the tightness of controls is summarized by the (simple) average of
the three indexes, accf (not shown in the figure).
4. Data and methodology
4. A  Equations to be estimated
In this paper we investigate the effects of capital controls, in particular, the
unremunerated reserve requirement in effect in Chile between 1991 and 1998, on the way
firms finance their operations and on their cost of funds. We claim that the URR affects
firms differently depending on the possibilities they have to substitute among alternative
sources of funds. These possibilities depend on firms’ characteristics such as size, degree of
access to international capital markets, whether firms belong or not to a conglomerate, and
the economic sector in which they operate. To investigate these issues we estimate several
equations of the following general form:9
(3) Financial Structureit = α0 + α1 Asset Tangibilityit + α2 Asset Profitabilityit
+ α3 Asset Sizeit + α4 Banking Sector Developmentt + α5 Debt Market Developmentt
+ α6 Stock Market Developmentt + α7 Effective Reserve Requirementt + α8 Other
Capital Account Restrictionst + α9 Effective Reserve Requirementt Dj + αj Dj + ηi+εit
where i is a firm index, t is a time index, j is a group index, Dj is a dummy that takes value
1 if firm i belongs to group j and zero otherwise, ηi is a firm-specific effect, and εit is a
random term. Regression (3) is estimated for five different dependent variables, namely, (i)
total debt over total assets; (ii) retained earnings over total assets; (iii) paid capital (equity
exclusive of retained earnings) over total assets; (iv) short-term debt over total debt; and (v)
short-term financial debt over total short-term debt.
The first six regressors in equation (3) are control variables whose inclusion is
founded, both conceptually and empirically, in previous research (see Gallego and Loayza
(2001), Lee, Lee and Lee (1999), Schmuker and Vesperoni (2001)). The first three
regressors (asset tangibility, profitability, and size) are firm specific, while the latter three
are common to all firms –an increase in all three financial development indices means more
developed banks, debt or stock markets. As explained in the previous section, the effective
reserve requirement (err) measures the extent to which the URR effectively taxes capital
inflows after taking into account changes in its power and coverage (for more details about
its construction see Gallego et al., 1999). Other capital account restrictions is an index
summarizing the extent of administrative restrictions on inflows and outflows other than
the URR (introduced as accf in the previous section; an increase signals a more restrictive
environment). Finally, Dj is a dummy used to test for different effects of the URR across
firm groups.
In some of the estimated regressions –in particular, when the dependent variable is
(i), (ii) or (iii) above– we included a variable to control for changes in marginal tax rates.
This tax variable was defined as the difference between the maximum personal income tax
rate and the corporate tax rate (see Bennett et al. (2001) for details). It is expected that an
increase in this difference should induce firms to use more retained earnings. The results,
reported in Annex 2, show that the estimated coefficient has the correct sign but is not
highly significant. Furthermore, the results with the tax variable are almost identical to
those without it (i.e., its exclusion does not bias any of the other coefficients). For this
reason in the final results reported here we do not include the tax variable.
In addition, we investigate the effects of the URR on the firms’ cost of funds. For this
we estimate the following equation:
(4) Financial Expendituresit = α0 + α1 Asset Sizeit + α2 Leverageit + α3 Cost of borrowing
domesticallyt + α4 Restrictions on Capital Outflowst + α5 Cost of borrowing abroadt
+ α6 Index of financial liberalizationt + α7 Cost of borrowing domesticallyt Dj
+ α8 Cost of borrowing abroadt Dj + αj Dj + ηi + εit10
where financial expenditures are in percent of total outstanding debt and the cost of
borrowing domestically is the average bank (real
20) lending rate in the domestic market.
Restrictions on capital outflows (calculated as the simple average of accr and acco) is an
index measuring the extent of administrative restrictions on outflows –again, an increase
means a more restrictive environment. Its inclusion is motivated by the findings reported in
Gallego et al. (2002) that show that lifting restrictions on outflows led to an increase in the
level of domestic interest rates. The cost of borrowing abroad is constructed as the sum of
LIBOR plus country risk plus the financial cost of the effective reserve requirement, err,
and the index of financial liberalization measures the extent of financial repression (an
increase means a lower degree of financial repression). The inclusion of all variables is
supported by previous research.
Except for asset size (measured as the natural log of total assets), all firm specific
variables, the costs of borrowing, err, and the financial development indices are measured
as ratios. The index of financial liberalization and the capital account restrictions are
indices. Data sources and a detailed definition of each variable are provided in Annex 1.
4. B  Data and sample description
In this paper we use balance sheet data for 73 Chilean companies for the period 1986-
2001 (N = 1168). Thus, we span the period when Chile had relatively unhindered access to
voluntary foreign capital markets, 1989-97, and the periods when voluntary flows to
emerging market economies were more scarce, 1986-88 (the post debt-crisis years) and
1998-2001 (the post Asian crisis years).
The sample comprises companies whose debt or equity are publicly traded and,
therefore, are required to make their financial statements publicly available on a quarterly
basis.
21 Since the latter tend to be medium and large corporations, our sample is not
representative of the universe of Chilean companies; that is, our conclusions are subject to
an unavoidable sample selection bias.
22 Nevertheless, our sample includes about 73% of all
the firms that submitted their financial statements throughout the sample period.
23
Despite this being the first attempt to directly measure the microeconomic effects of
the URR, because of this unavoidable sample selection bias the effect of this policy
measure on the Chilean smallest firms remains unexplored. However, it could be argued
that this sample-induced bias is not very important because the effects uncovered here are
of most relevance to larger and financially more sophisticated firms. In other words, to the
extent that very small (micro) firms follow rudimentary financial strategies and have
limited access to funding other than self generated funds (retained earnings), they will have
                                                                
20 CPI indexed.
21 According to Chilean law, the so-called closed corporations that do not issue debt or equity instruments
are not required to publish their financial statements.
22 According to the IRS, in 2000 approximately 83% of Chilean firms were micro firms, 14% were small,
2% were medium and less than 1% were large (for size definitions see footnote 25). However, in terms of
sales micro firms represented less than 4%, small and medium represented about 10% each group and
large firms represented slightly more than 76% of the total.
23 We explicitly excluded financial institutions (banks) and other non-productive firms (social clubs, etc.)11
limited possibilities of substituting among sources of funds and most likely will not be
affected by the URR.
We use a balanced panel or closed sample, as opposed to an unbalanced or open
sample –that is, firms in the sample are those for which data was available the entire
period.
24 To study the differentiated effects of the URR across firms we break the sample
using the following criteria:
(a) Size: we differentiate between small, medium and large firms depending on their annual
sales.
25
(b) Access to international capital markets: we distinguish between firms that issue ADRs
or bonds in the international capital markets and those that do not.
(c) Belong to a conglomerate: we distinguish between those firms that are part of a
conglomerate or “economic group” and those that are not.
(d) Economic sector: we separate firms according to the economic sector in which they
participate. We distinguish between the following: (1) primary –agriculture, fishing,
livestock, and mining; (2) manufacture; (3) utilities –electricity, gas, water, and
telephone; (4) services –real estate agencies, schools, and clinics; (5) transportation –
airlines, railroads, and shipping; (6) financial –stock exchange, mutual funds, and
brokers. In addition we analyze the following: (7) tradable –primary, manufacture,
airlines, and shipping.
Table 7 describes the sample composition and the intersection among different firm
groups. It can be seen that except for firms that issue securities –ADRs and bonds– abroad,
which are all large, and those in the transportation and financial sectors, which are under
represented, there is a relatively even distribution of firms across groups in the sample.
Based on this, it will not be possible to reach strong conclusions regarding the behavior of
firms in the transportation and financial sectors. Table 8 provides summary statistics for
some of the dependent and independent variables for the whole sample as well as for
individual years.
4. C  Econometric Methodology
All the reduced form relationships studied in this paper are characterized by the
dependent and (some) independent variables being jointly determined, that is, some right-
hand side variables are either simultaneously determined or have a two-way causality
relationship with the dependent variable in the six equations estimated here. For instance,
leverage, asset profitability and asset size are all jointly determined. Because of this and the
panel structure of our dataset, we use a GMM estimator that uses lag observations of the
independent variables as instruments to obtain consistent estimates for the coefficients of
                                                                
24 The use of an unbalanced panel or open sample would allow a greater number of observations, but would
invalidate the conclusions to the extent that firms leaving the sample are different from those entering it.
25 We use the standard set by the Chilean IRS, according to which large firms sell more than UF 100,000
annually, medium firms sell between UF 25,000 and UF 100,000 annually, and small firms sell between
UF 2,400 and UF 25,000 annually (at the time of writing UF1 @ US$23). Most firms remain in the same
size group every year. Those firms that change size during the sample period were classified according to
the size group in which they fell most of the years.12
interest. This procedure is valid to the extent that the error term in equations 3 and 4 above
is serially uncorrelated (or at least follows a moving average process of finite order), and
that future innovations of the dependent variables do not affect current values of the right-
hand side variables (though the latter can be affected by past and current realizations of the
dependent variable).
The validity of these assumptions can be verified statistically using both the Sargan
test –which tests for the validity of the instruments
26– and tests of serial correlation of the
residual in each regression (the latter is used to decide on the adequate lag structure of the
instruments
27).
In addition, because our regressions are most likely subject to unobserved firm
specific effects –which if ignored would lead to biased estimates because such effects tend
to be correlated with the explanatory variables–, we follow the procedure developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997). This consists of estimating a
system that combines the regression estimated in levels with the one estimated in first
differences, each of them properly instrumented. This procedure, called the GMM System
Estimator, is used in all our regressions. Specification tests in this case are the same
described above except that first-order serial correlation is expected by construction
because of taking first differences –i.e., only second and third order serial correlation of the
residual are indication of misspecification  (these specification tests are provided for all our
regressions in tables 1-6 below). For a detailed description of the econometric technique
used in this paper see Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), and Gallego and Loayza (2001).
The GMM system technique is validated because when using GMM in levels we
strongly reject the null hypothesis that there are no firm specific effects in all regressions.
28
In addition, simpler econometric techniques –plain OLS and GMM in levels– provide poor
and biased results. In fact, preliminary estimations –reported in Annex 3– show that
coefficients change significantly when going from simpler to more sophisticated
econometric techniques.
5. Empirical results 
29
5. A  General conclusions
Before discussing the effects of capital controls it is worth to highlight some general
results concerning the way firms finance their operations. All results reported below are
consistent with previous results on corporate finance provided elsewhere, for Chile as well
                                                                
26 The null hypothesis in the Sargan test is that there is no correlation between the instruments and the error
term in the regression. Rejecting the null means that the instruments are not valid and the estimates are
biased.
27 Serial correlation of a given order in the residual means that only observations of the right-hand side
variables that are lagged more than this order are valid instruments.
28 The presence of unobserved firm specific effects is detected by persistent serial correlation of the residual
in the regression model in levels.
29 The results are presented in tables 1-6. It should be noted that the discussion in this section is organized by
regressor, whereas in the tables the results are presented by dependent variable.13
as other countries (see Medina and Valdes (1998); Gallego and Loayza (2001); Schmukler
and Vesperoni (2001); Lee, Lee and Lee (1999); Hoshi et al. (1991)). In particular:
•  Firms with a larger share of fixed assets (i.e., greater asset tangibility) tend to be more
indebted and depend less on retained earnings as a source of funding. Also, firms with
greater asset tangibility –for which it is easier to guarantee their loans using assets as
collateral– can borrow longer and, therefore, tend to have a smaller share of short-term
debt in the total.
•  Firms with more profitable assets (higher earnings/assets) tend to have less debt and a
smaller capital base (excluding in the latter retained earnings) and rely more on retained
earnings as a source of funding. However, although an increase in asset profitability
significantly increases the share of assets that is financed with retained earnings, the
bulk of the reduction in the other sources of funding occurs not in debt but in paid-in
capital. Also, firms with more profitable assets can borrow more in the short-term,
although the relative importance of short-term financial debt falls. The latter effect may
reflect the fact that highly profitable firms tend to be relatively young (compared with
others in the sample) and fast growing (with a large cash flow), and it may be relatively
easier for them to obtain direct trade credit from suppliers than from banks.
•  Larger firms tend to use more debt and retained earnings, carry proportionately less
short-term debt (i.e., have easier access to long-term debt markets), and have a smaller
capital base
30. Although results vary across firm groups, evidence indicates that firms
tend to finance their growth proportionally more with retained earnings. Thus, while an
increase in total assets of one-percent (1%) leads to an increase in leverage (debt over
total assets) of about 2 percentage points,
31 it leads to an increase in retained earnings
(again as a share of total assets) of about 4-7 percentage points. This result is consistent
with empirical evidence for Chile, as well as other countries, that shows a high
sensitivity of investment to firms’ internal funds (Medina and Valdes (1998); Gallego
and Loayza (2001) and references therein; Fazzari et al. (1988)).
•  As expected, the more developed the banking sector the greater the indebtedness of
firms and the less the use of retained earnings to fund their operations. Also, although
not statistically significant in all regressions that group firms by type, a more developed
debt market (measured by the size of banks and bond market) leads to a reduction in
short-term debt as a share of the total. Further, more developed banks and debt markets
lead to a fall in the relative importance of short-term financial debt, meaning that greater
financial development is relatively more important for the provision of long-term
finance. In other words, for short-term financing firms can turn to direct credit from
suppliers or delay the payment of dividends and taxes, among other sources, all of which
can occur without a well developed banking sector or debt market. However, the latter
                                                                
30 This result contrasts with the pattern observed in OECD countries where capitalization is higher for larger
firms. In this regard it should be noted that other studies also report differences across countries, especially
between developed and developing ones, in the way firms finance their operations (see Booth et al. (2001)
and Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt (1998)). This difference can also be explained in part because our measure
of capital excludes retained earnings and therefore is a poor proxy for equity.
31 Since short-term debt falls with asset size, the increase in long-term debt must be proportionally larger.14
are more important for the provision of long term finance that can substitute for short-
term finance.
•  Similarly, a more developed stock market leads to lower debt, a larger capital base and
greater use of retained earnings. The latter effect may be due because a more developed
stock market prices retained earnings higher, giving firms a greater incentive to use this
channel to fund their growth. An increase in market capitalization of ten percent of GDP
reduces leverage (as a proportion of total assets) in about 0.6 percentage points. The
reduction in leverage is compensated with an increase in paid-in capital and retained
earnings of about 0.2 and 0.4 percentage points of total assets, respectively.
•  Regarding the cost of funding, results show that a more developed and liberal financial
system reduces the cost of borrowing (Table 6). Also, larger firms can borrow at a lower
cost than smaller ones, and, as expected, more indebted firms pay a positive premium
(i.e., face a higher cost of borrowing). In addition, both the domestic and external
relevant interest rates (the latter being adjusted by country risk and the effective
financial cost of the URR) are important to explain firms’ cost of funding. In this regards
our results validate previous research indicating that the cost of funding in developing
countries should be seen as a weighted average of the conditions in the domestic and
external financial markets (Edwards and Khan, 1985). Although the relative importance
of the domestic and external rate for each firm depends on its own characteristics, for the
average firm the cost of domestic credit seems to matter proportionately more.
5. B  Capital account restrictions other than the reserve requirement
The lifting of capital restrictions affecting both inflows and outflows during the 1990s
(other than the unremunerated reserve requirement, err), led to a raise in the relative
importance of paid-in-capital and a fall in the use of retained earnings as sources of finance.
Across the board, it shortened the maturity of debt while raising the relative importance of
short-term financial debt in the total. Thus, capital account restrictions (other than the err)
at the margin affected firms’ financing decisions, so that when restrictions were lifted firms
began to issue more equity and use more short-term financial debt. However, despite
changing the maturity composition of debt these restrictions did not have a systematic
effect on leverage.
Consistent with previous results (Gallego et al., 2002), the lifting of restrictions on
capital outflows increased the cost of funding for all firm groups. It is plausible that
allowing Chilean investors (especially institutional investors such as pension funds) to
invest abroad, may have –at the margin– increased the cost of borrowing for Chilean firms.
In other words, keeping national savings ‘captive’ in the local market may have resulted in
an artificially lower cost of borrowing for firms in our sample.
5. C Reserve Requirement (err)
We purposely separate the results that concern the unremunerated reserve
requirement from those regarding other capital controls because the former is the policy15
instrument that most of the literature emphasizes and is the main motivation for
undertaking this research.
At the aggregate level the unremunerated reserve requirement significantly affected
the ways in which firms finance their operations as well as their cost of funding. In
particular, the err led to a reduction in leverage and in paid capital and an increase in the
relative importance of retained earnings, effects that are fully consistent with the err raising
the relative cost of borrowing and issuing equity 
32 (base regression in Tables 1-3). On
average the magnitude of these effects is not very large, however. For instance, an increase
in the err of 0.036
33 would have, on average, reduced leverage and capitalization by about
one percentage point each, while increasing retained earnings (over total assets) by about 2
percentage points
34. Thus, it can be argued, at the margin firms substituted non-err taxable
for err-taxable sources of funds.
Similarly, at the aggregate level the err raised firms’ external cost of funding, while
monetary policy remained effective in affecting aggregate demand by being able to
raise/reduce firms’ cost of funding –in other words, in the aggregate firms were unable to
fully avoid the effects of a raise in domestic interest rates by shifting to foreign sources of
funds. This result is consistent with previous evidence showing that the URR introduced a
wedge between domestic and foreign arbitraged interest rates, thus making domestic
interest rates more independent from external conditions (push factors).
35 Although
statistically significant, the average effect of the err on the external cost of funding is rather
small –an increase in the err of 0.036 would have raised the average external cost of
funding only in 12 basis points per year. However, this effect would have been larger for
some firm groups (about 60 basis points in the case of small firms and those that can issue
securities abroad).
Surprisingly, firms shortened the maturity of debt while, at the same time, reducing
the relative importance of short-term financial debt. The first result may appear strange at
first sight because the err was designed to tax more heavily short-term flows and, therefore,
it was expected to lengthen the maturity of debt. Our view is that in their attempt to
substitute non-err taxable for err-taxable funding firms resorted to credit from suppliers and
other non-financial short-term funding, such as delaying the payment of taxes and
dividends, among other sources. Also, since the banking sector in Chile is tightly monitored
by the central bank, it must have been extremely difficult (costly) to by-pass or elude the
                                                                
32 Starting in July 1995, the URR taxed the so-called secondary ADRs, i.e., the purchase by foreigners of
shares in the domestic stock exchange (see Annex 2 in Gallego et al., 1999).
33 This is equivalent to raising the err in 3.6% per year and corresponds to moving from the 25
th to the 75
th
percentile of the err distribution.
34 Based on the results for the base regression, that is, without distinguishing groups of firms. In terms of the
whole sample averages the effects are larger: leverage falls by about 4 percent and capitalization by about
2 percent, while retained earnings increase by about 10 percent
35 This interpretation does not follow strictly from the results reported here but from those in Table 6 and in
Gallego et al. (2002). Note also that increases in the domestic lending rate can occur because of a
tightening in monetary policy or an increase in the err –although results in Gallego et al. show that the rate
set by the central bank is by far the most important determinant of the lending rate. Thus, we could not
claim that firms are able to fully avoid the effects of the err by shifting to domestic sources of funds even
if the coefficient for the latter variable in Table 6 had turned out equal to zero.16
err when borrowing from the financial sector. In other words, short-term financial debt was
fully err-taxable
36 and that explains the reduction in its participation in the total.
But the average results above can be misleading if one is interested in knowing how
the err affected one particular firm or group of firms, or, put differently, if one wants to
know whether the err has distinct effects across different economic sectors. As firms differ
in their degree of access to international capital markets, economic sector in which they
operate, needs of external financing, size and other characteristics defining how
successfully or easily they can replace one source of funding with another, it is expected
that the effects of the err will differ across them. Thus, for example, large firms, those
belonging to a conglomerate, and those able to issue securities (bonds or equity) abroad
responded to the err by substituting paid-equity for debt, i.e., they reduced their leverage by
increasing their capital base but without resorting to retained earnings. On the contrary,
small and medium size firms and those in the services sector were unable to reduce their
leverage, but reduced their capital base and resorted to retained earnings. Somewhere in
between, firms in the tradable sector –comprising primary, manufacture and transportation–
reduced their capital base and leverage by resorting to retained earnings.
Similarly, the response in the term-structure of debt differs significantly among firm
groups. For instance, firms belonging to economic conglomerates and those able to issue
securities abroad were able to significantly reduce their reliance on short-term financial
debt without changing their overall term structure of debt. On the contrary, small firms and
those in the services sector increased their reliance on both short term and short-term
financial debt. One possibility that explains this result is that small firms and those in the
services sector are subject to credit rationing in normal times, and only had access to
additional bank credit when other firms (prime borrowers) reduced their demand for funds
from the banking sector.
37
In addition, large firms and those in the primary and manufacture sector shortened the
maturity of debt without increasing the share of short-term financial debt in the total, while
medium-size firms and those in the utilities and transportation sector did not shorten the
maturity of debt and did not change the share of short-term financial debt in the total.
And a similar conclusion can be drawn with regards to the cost of funding. As Table
6 shows (and indicated earlier), the err increased the cost of funding from abroad, but its
impact was different across firm groups. In particular, increases in the URR (ceteris
paribus) raised the cost of funding only for small firms, those belonging to economic
conglomerates, those that had access to international capital markets (that issued equity and
bonds) and those in the manufacture sector.
38 Other firm groups were able to avoid its
                                                                
36 A similar point is suggested by Soto and Valdés-Prieto (1996).
37 We cannot provide empirical evidence to support this claim, but several interest groups –small
entrepreneurs among them– are of the view that banks do not provide enough funding to small and
medium size firms in Chile.
38 It should be noted that the specific channel through which a raise in the URR increases the cost of funding
is undetermined. It could be direct if firms borrow abroad (like most likely is in the case of those firms
belonging to economic conglomerates or those with access to international capital markets) or indirect if
acting through the domestic financial system (like most likely is the case of small firms).17
effects (from a statistical point of view) either because of having low debt initially or
because they were able to substitute non-err taxable for err-taxable funds. Since trade credit
was exempt from the URR, one possibility is that some firms were able to obtain external
funding from trade partners. In the case of large firms it is also plausible that they were able
to reduce the effects of the URR by passing on the additional cost to suppliers (for instance,
by delaying the payment of bills). This would be consistent with the behavior observed in
Chile in 1998 in the height of the financial markets turmoil, when interest rates in Chile
(and in other emerging market economies) reached extremely high levels. During this
period a group of large firms arbitrarily extended the payment period to suppliers from 90
to 180 days, forcing smaller firms to assume the increase in the cost of funds.
In sum, the err changed –at the margin– the way firms funded their operations,
although such changes differed across firms most likely because of the possibilities that
each firm had to minimize its effects.
39 It can be claimed, therefore, that the URR (err)
introduced a distortion that at the margin changed the funding patterns and costs of firms,
but the effects were not uniform across firm groups.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper extends previous research on the Chilean capital controls during the
1990s, by analyzing some of their microeconomic consequences. Relying on previous
results and data, this paper looks into the financial statements of a group of 73 Chilean
firms and studies the effects of the capital controls in effect in Chile during the 1990s –in
particular, the unremunerated reserve requirement–, on firms’ forms of financing and cost
of capital. The main result of the paper is that, at the margin, capital controls altered firms’
financing decisions but, most important, the URR affected firms differently.
Because firms differ in their characteristics, some were more successful than others in
their attempt to minimize the effects of the URR on their costs of funding. Therefore, one
may be tempted to conclude that the URR was ‘unfair’ because the burden of the measure
was not equally spread among firms. Furthermore, one may argue that capital controls
caused a deadweight loss –in terms of resource misallocation– precisely because firms
attempted to minimize their effects by changing their financial structure (and some
successfully did so)
40. Our empirical results certainly support this line of argument as we
find that Chilean firms reacted to the URR by reducing their leverage and increasing their
reliance on self generated funds (retained earnings). Also, we find that firms reduced their
dependence on short-term financial debt. In sum, the evidence provided here supports the
view that capital controls, by distorting relative prices in the economy, were costly.
But the argument above is misleading –or at least incomplete– and, therefore, may
lead to the wrong conclusion. Even if there is an apparent deadweight loss due to resource
                                                                
39 The err-induced response does nor necessarily mean that firms were able to completely avoid the tax, but
to reduce its effects by choosing a channel of funding subject to a lower effective tax.
40 In other words, to the extent that the demand and supply for equity and debt have elasticity different from
zero and firms successfully change their financial structures, the introduction of the URR will cause a
deadweight loss for the society as a whole.18
misallocation at the micro level (partial equilibrium analysis), that doesn’t mean that in the
whole the URR and the other administrative controls in effect during 1991-98 were not
desirable. Indeed, as argued elsewhere (see Gallego et al. (2002)), capital controls have no
place in a frictionless world, but they may be granted once one acknowledges the
possibility of market imperfections such as moral hazard resulting from “excessive”
insurance of different kind (for instance, on bank deposits or foreign exchange risk). In
addition, it has been shown that the URR changed the term composition of the capital flows
received by Chile toward long term and more stable flows such as foreign direct
investment. By reducing the vulnerability resulting from the build up of speculative short
term flows the URR most likely helped the country during the Asian, Russian and Brazilian
crises of 1997-98.
In other words, it is wrong to conclude that to the extent that firms try to avoid the tax
on capital inflows by changing their financial structure, the controls inflict a burden on the
society as a whole. To assess the social cost of capital controls we need a general
equilibrium model that explicitly identifies the existing distortions that the controls are
trying to correct. It is plausible that some firms (or a group of firms) tend to overborrow
more because there is a greater chance that they will be bailed out by the government in
case of trouble. The latter may occur if, for instance, these firms are more labor intensive
and the government doesn’t want to see a rise in unemployment. If this is the case and these
firms are less able to avoid or elude the tax, then the capital controls as implemented in
Chile are the correct policy. Even if the controls appear unfair they can be justified from a
social point of view.
In sum, this paper complements previous research concerning the macroeconomic
effects of the capital controls in place in Chile during the 1990s. But we cannot yet reach a
final conclusion regarding the desirability of the Chilean capital controls. To do the latter
all the effects reported elsewhere –that the URR effectively introduced a wedge between
domestic and foreign arbitraged interest rates and changed the composition of capital
inflows– must be analyzed jointly with the evidence reported here – that the URR affected
the financing patterns and the cost of funds unevenly across firm groups. Despite this, we
believe that most likely there are better ways to design the policy instrument to achieve
only some of the results but not all. Some of the results –for instance, firms shortening the
maturity of debt and relying more on non-financial debt– appear to exacerbate vulnerability
as opposed to enhance macroeconomic stability.19
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Table 1. Dependent Variable: Leverage
Dependent Variable: Leverage 1. Base regression 2. Economic Groups
3. Can issue securities
abroad
4. Small firms 5. Medium size 6. Large firms










Constant -0,1801 b -0,1246 -0,1644 b 0,2088 b -0,2481 a -0,2805 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,1775 a 0,1928 a 0,2044 a 0,1986 a 0,2062 a 0,1964 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,1698 a -0,1353 a -0,1804 a -0,2296 a -0,2006 a -0,1978 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0232 a 0,0206 a 0,0212 a 0,0018 0,0269 a 0,0298 a
Banks Development 0,1406 a 0,1406 a 0,1452 a 0,1391 a 0,1064 a 0,1160 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization -0,0665 a -0,0665 a -0,0642 a -0,0622 a -0,0673 a -0,0670 a
err (A) -0,3029 a -0,3306 a -0,1789 a -0,3081 a -0,4081 a -0,2422 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0082 0,0000 0,0019 -0,0213 b 0,0079 0,0166 c
err specific group effect (B) 0,0363 -0,9886 b 0,1234 0,2711 c -0,0930
Constant for the group -0,0296 c 0,0434 b -0,1118 a 0,0366 a -0,0205
err net group effect (A+B) -0,294 a -1,167 a -0,1847 -0,13701 -0,3352 b
Wald test of joint significance: 661,97 0,0000 173,78 0,0000 825,94 0,0000 893,39 0,0000 436,67 0,000 590,17 0,000
Sargan test: 70,26 0,8190 64,96 0,9280 65,94 0,9150 64,49 0,9340 67,04 0,899 68,72 0,870
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-2,02 0,0430 -2,04 0,0410 -2,16 0,0310 -2,15 0,0310 -2,10 0,036 -2,08 0,038
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,39 0,6960 -0,39 0,6980 -0,63 0,5270 -0,60 0,5460 -0,48 0,628 -0,44 0,657
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
1,10 0,2710 1,03 0,3020 1,10 0,2700 1,27 0,2030 1,14 0,256 1,14 0,253
Dependent Variable: Leverage 7. Tradable
sector
8. Primary
sector 9. Manufacture 10. Utilities 11. Services 12. Transportation












Constant -0,3116 a -0,1735 b -0,2010 a -0,1930 b -0,2544 a -0,1343 b
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,2318 a 0,1991 a 0,1696 a 0,1819 a 0,2045 a 0,1642 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,1238 a -0,1559 a -0,1698 a -0,1398 a -0,1663 a -0,1165 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0270 a 0,0234 a 0,0236 a 0,0234 a 0,0284 a 0,0209 a
Banks Development 0,1471 a 0,1144 a 0,1437 a 0,1330 a 0,0782 a 0,1470 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization -0,0656 a -0,0662 a -0,0606 a -0,0592 a -0,0674 a -0,0673 a
err (A) -0,1027 -0,2341 a -0,1346 -0,3693 a -0,3467 a -0,2805 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0078 0,0043 0,0083 0,0077 0,0059 0,0027
err specific group effect (B) -0,4069 b -0,2065 -0,5346 a 0,2530 0,1044 -0,1753
Constant for the group 0,0572 a -0,0259 0,0258 c 0,0061 0,0304 -0,1605 a
err net group effect (A+B) -0,5095 a -0,4406 c -0,6691 a -0,1163 -0,2423 -0,4558 c
Wald test of joint significance: 710,58 0,0000 693,77 0,0000 266,79 0,0000 460,62 0,0000 632,34 0,0000 1012,09 0,0000
Sargan test: 69,88 0,8470 69,63 0,8520 67,02 0,8990 67,22 0,8960 66,43 0,9080 63,11 0,9490
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-2,11 0,0350 -2,04 0,0410 -2,04 0,0420 -2,01 0,0450 -2,08 0,0380 -2,01 0,0440
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,48 0,6330 -0,40 0,6870 -0,50 0,6210 -0,38 0,7030 -0,43 0,6650 -0,33 0,7430
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
0,99 0,3230 1,06 0,2870 1,08 0,2790 1,03 0,3050 1,08 0,2790 1,04 0,3000
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%23







3. Can issue securities
abroad
4. Small firms 5. Medium size 6. Large firms












Constant -0,6009 a -0,4989 a -0,7585 a -0,9991 a -0,7822 a -0,8624 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,2319 a -0,2027 a -0,1968 a -0,1650 a -0,1837 a -0,2518 a
Current earnings/Total assets 0,6248 a 0,8107 a 0,7603 a 0,8375 a 0,8690 a 0,8056 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0549 a 0,0410 a 0,0607 a 0,0709 a 0,0578 a 0,0726 a
Banks Development -0,2173 a -0,1211 a -0,1690 a -0,1695 a -0,1204 a -0,2138 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization 0,0357 a 0,0560 a 0,0495 a 0,0467 a 0,0500 a 0,0525 a
err (A) 0,4697 a 0,9136 a 0,6156 a 0,3683 a 0,2688 b 0,8707 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0322 a 0,0356 a 0,0564 a 0,0664 a 0,0471 a 0,0785 a
err specific group effect (B) -0,8208 a -0,6319 a 0,4551 c 0,7382 a -0,8403 a
Constant for the group 0,0837 a -0,1597 a 0,1305 a 0,0723 a -0,1805 a
err net group effect (A+B) 0,0928 -0,0163 0,8234 a 1,0070 b 0,0304
Wald test of joint significance: 4012,72 0,0000 1968,36 0,0000 16276,45 0,0000 4885,59 0,0000 7468,87 0,0000 1538,80 0,0000
Sargan test: 64,36 0,8830 63,08 0,9490 62,36 0,7300 65,96 0,9150 66,83 0,9020 64,38 0,9350
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
1,74 0,0810 1,42 0,1560 1,52 0,1280 1,38 0,1690 1,32 0,1860 1,45 0,1480
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
1,91 0,0560 1,81 0,0700 1,82 0,0690 1,76 0,0780 1,71 0,0880 1,72 0,0850
Test for third-order serial
correlation:






sector 9. Manufacture 10. Utilities 11. Services 12. Transportation












Constant -0,6900 a -0,3818 a -0,6624 a -0,3640 a -0,7329 a -0,7107 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,2173 a -0,3022 a -0,1470 a -0,3123 a -0,1729 a -0,1455 a
Current earnings/Total assets 0,8327 a 0,8932 a 0,8144 a 0,7427 a 0,7258 a 0,7680 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0550 a 0,0400 a 0,0505 a 0,0384 a 0,0595 a 0,0572 a
Banks Development -0,1867 a -0,1950 a -0,1221 a -0,1540 a -0,1833 a -0,1484 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization 0,0531 a 0,0469 a 0,0451 a 0,0460 a 0,0405 a 0,0477 a
err (A) 0,3902 b 0,2723 a 0,0388 1,4667 a 0,1630 b 0,3669 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0488 a 0,0421 a 0,0361 a 0,0372 a 0,0491 a 0,0457 a
err specific group effect (B) 0,3589 0,8546 a 1,6241 a -2,2132 a 1,7843 a 0,4791 c
Constant for the group 0,0584 b 0,1163 a 0,0601 a 0,0830 a -0,0719 a -0,5905 a
err net group effect (A+B) 0,7492 a 1,1269 a 1,6629 a -0,7465 a 1,9474 a 0,8460 a
Wald test of joint significance: 3307,53 0,0000 9387,06 0,0000 8445,96 0,0000 2848,61 0,0000 48677,69 0,0000 3258,81 0,0000
Sargan test: 65,42 0,9230 92,60 0,2210 64,43 0,9350 64,27 0,6710 63,27 0,7030 63,86 0,9410
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
1,37 0,1710 1,30 0,1940 1,57 0,1160 1,82 0,0680 1,75 0,0810 1,54 0,1230
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
1,73 0,0840 1,69 0,0910 1,72 0,0850 1,80 0,0720 1,85 0,0640 1,83 0,0670
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
0,83 0,4080 0,86 0,3900 0,47 0,6390 0,34 0,7350 0,72 0,4740 0,75 0,4520
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%24









4. Small firms 5. Medium size 6. Large firms












Constant 1,5515 a 1,7840 a 1,7402 a 2,3067 a 1,9408 a 2,2515 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,1207 a -0,0502 a 0,0261 -0,0601 a -0,0001 0,0033
Current earnings/Total assets -0,4751 a -0,6829 a -0,6309 a -0,6392 a -0,5729 a -0,5142 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0662 a -0,0688 a -0,0721 a -0,1007 a -0,0815 a -0,1086 a
Banks Development 0,1001 a -0,0006 0,0707 0,0628 b 0,0791 c 0,1307 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization 0,0284 a 0,0119 0,0173 c 0,0195 b 0,0237 a 0,0298 a
err (A) -0,3080 a -0,7155 a -0,5956 a -0,1377 a 0,0219 -0,8187 a
Capital account restrictions -0,0227 c -0,0350 a -0,0378 a -0,0758 a -0,0454 a -0,0827 a
err specific group effect (B) 0,8894 a 1,9163 a -0,6522 a -1,1050 a 1,2971 a
Constant for the group -0,0460 a 0,0424 -0,0889 a -0,1244 a 0,1994 a
err net group effect (A+B) 0,1739 a 1,3207 a -0,7899 a -1,0831 b 0,4783 b
Wald test of joint significance: 3057,34 0,0000 8986,50 0,0000 4182,16 0,0000 55570,93 0,0000 14844,22 0,0000 9673,47 0,0000
Sargan test: 67,11 0,8270 70,06 0,4760 69,39 0,4980 70,02 0,4770 68,32 0,5350 65,25 0,6380
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-0,85 0,3980 -1,41 0,1590 -1,29 0,1980 -1,41 0,1600 -1,29 0,1970 -1,31 0,1900
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
1,64 0,1000 1,43 0,1530 1,36 0,1740 1,43 0,1520 1,42 0,1560 1,42 0,1550
Test for third-order serial
correlation:







9. Manufacture 10. Utilities 11. Services 12. Transportation












Constant 1,8842 a 1,6826 a 1,6932 a 1,4430 a 2,0301 a 1,8628 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,0255 0,0478 0,0820 b 0,1698 a -0,0159 a -0,0353 c
Current earnings/Total assets -0,6494 a -0,6486 a -0,5892 a -0,5576 a -0,6170 a -0,6237 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0747 a -0,0696 a -0,0685 a -0,0581 a -0,0873 a -0,0791 a
Banks Development 0,0388 0,0537 0,0493 0,0419 0,0672 a 0,0698 b
Stock Mkt. Capitalization 0,0204 a 0,0324 a 0,0114 0,0209 0,0192 b 0,0197 a
err (A) -0,1596 a -0,0573 0,1979 -1,1009 a 0,0236 0,0004
Capital account restrictions -0,0376 a -0,0304 b -0,0304 b -0,0247 c -0,0586 a -0,0457 a
err specific group effect (B) -0,2968 a -0,7902 a -1,9016 a 1,8224 a -1,7424 a -0,8169 a
Constant for the group -0,1438 a -0,0743 a -0,0786 a -0,0399 b -0,0152 0,5178 a
err net group effect (A+B) -0,4564 a -0,8475 a -1,7037 a 0,7215 a -1,7188 a -0,8165 a
Wald test of joint significance: 11078,84 0,0000 1368,34 0,0000 1869,78 0,0000 872,26 0,0000 4995,31 0,0000 3228,39 0,0000
Sargan test: 67,98 0,5460 71,74 0,8060 66,17 0,9120 62,89 0,9510 68,87 0,5160 70,07 0,4750
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-1,21 0,2280 -1,14 0,2550 -1,11 0,2660 -0,92 0,3580 -1,25 0,2110 -1,26 0,2090
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
1,50 0,1350 1,50 0,1330 1,37 0,1720 1,43 0,1530 1,39 0,1650 1,54 0,1230
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,09 0,9270 -0,08 0,9370 -0,10 0,9240 -0,01 0,9930 -0,24 0,8080 -0,10 0,9220
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%25
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Short-term debt over total debt
Dependent Variable: Short





3. Can issue securities
abroad
4. Small firms 5. Medium size 6. Large firms












Constant 2,4568 a 2,5204 a 2,7674 a 2,2703 a 2,3391 a 2,545 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,2543 a -0,1978 a -0,0991 a -0,0855 c -0,0872 c -0,137 a
Current earnings/Total assets 0,2989 a 0,2500 a 0,4282 a 0,3221 a 0,3785 a 0,375 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0967 a -0,1077 a -0,1262 a -0,0956 a -0,1015 a -0,115 a
Banks and Bonds Development -0,1018 a -0,0428 0,0290 -0,0023 0,0222 0,052
err (A) 0,4279 a 0,5885 a 0,3585 a 0,0307 0,5836 a 0,594 a
Capital account restrictions -0,0625 a -0,0734 a -0,0925 a -0,0381 c -0,0471 b -0,055 b
err specific group effect (B) -0,4794 c -0,0842 1,0609 a -0,6901 a -0,357 c
Constant for the group 0,1020 a 0,0784 a -0,0087 0,0214 0,056
err net group effect (A+B) 0,1091 0,2744 1,0916 a -0,1065 a 0,236 a
Wald test of joint significance: 1642,16 0,0000 1732,03 0,0000 6888,62 0,0000 417,05 0,0000 542,17 0,00 819,50 0,00
Sargan test: 62,65 0,6600 66,17 0,8980 67,17 0,5400 56,37 0,4610 58,62 0,38 58,77 0,37
Test for first-order serial
correlation:
-3,77 0,0000 -3,80 0,0000 -3,96 0,0000 -3,92 0,0000 -3,94 0,00 -3,93 0,00
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,05 0,9640 -0,01 0,9910 -0,03 0,9740 0,01 0,9900 -0,01 0,99 -0,02 0,99
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,61 0,5430 -0,57 0,5690 -0,57 0,5710 -0,57 0,5680 -0,55 0,59 -0,57 0,57
Dependent Variable: Short




sector 9. Manufacture 10. Utilities 11. Services 12. Transportation












Constant 2,4786 a 2,4297 a 2,4393 a 2,0511 a 2,8537 a 2,4318 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,1980 a -0,2538 a -0,2179 a -0,1678 a -0,2367 a -0,1989 a
Current earnings/Total assets 0,3116 a 0,3426 a 0,2924 a 0,2788 a 0,2494 a 0,2627 a
Nat Log total assets -0,1049 a -0,0971 a -0,0977 a -0,0716 a -0,1210 a -0,0993 a
Banks and Bonds Development -0,0860 b -0,0905 b -0,0904 b -0,1358 a -0,0568 c -0,0579
err (A) 0,3673 b 0,3397 a 0,4081 a 0,4376 a 0,2427 a 0,4375 a
Capital account restrictions -0,0824 a -0,0656 a -0,0607 a -0,0425 a -0,0871 a -0,0611 a
err specific group effect (B) -0,0316 0,5540 b -0,1254 -0,4053 1,0547 a -0,2799
Constant for the group 0,1279 a 0,0839 a 0,0195 -0,1325 a -0,1649 a 0,1322 b
err net group effect (A+B) 0,3356 b 0,8936 a 0,2828 c 0,0323 1,2975 a 0,1576
Wald test of joint significance: 1172,12 0,0000 1571,03 0,0000 1111,40 0,0000 2005,97 0,0000 21926,69 0,0000 764,60 0,0000
Sargan test: 65,17 0,6080 63,47 0,6650 61,54 0,7260 50,52 0,9540 65,53 0,5960 66,60 0,8920
Test for first-order serial
correlation:
-3,82 0,0000 -3,79 0,0000 -3,79 0,0000 -3,82 0,0000 -3,77 0,0000 -3,80 0,0000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,04 0,9690 -0,06 0,9500 -0,04 0,9660 -0,01 0,9910 -0,06 0,9560 -0,01 0,9900
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,60 0,5480 -0,62 0,5370 -0,60 0,5490 -0,62 0,5360 -0,63 0,5300 -0,58 0,5640
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%26








securities abroad 4. Small firms 5. Medium
size 6. Large firms












Constant 0,9012 a 1,2392 a 0,9197 a 1,4565 a 0,804 a 1,383 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,0287 -0,0429 -0,0294 -0,0339 0,018 -0,010
Current earnings/Total assets -0,4183 a -0,3663 a -0,4541 a -0,4275 a -0,425 a -0,368 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0066 -0,0309 a -0,0111 c -0,0384 a -0,002 -0,050 a
Banks Development -0,3289 a -0,2491 a -0,2914 a -0,2589 a -0,275 a -0,149 c
Bonds Development -0,4881 a -0,5037 a -0,4479 a -0,4162 a -0,511 a -0,377 a
err (A) -0,3499 a 0,2334 c -0,1517 -0,6962 a -0,385 a -0,172
Capital account restrictions -0,2051 a -0,2299 a -0,1983 a -0,2224 a -0,214 a -0,232 a
err specific group effect (B) -1,0135 a -1,8745 a 1,0117 a 0,120 -0,751 b
Constant for the group 0,0891 b 0,1338 a -0,2483 a -0,028 0,279 a
err net group effect (A+B) -0,7801 a -2,0262 a 0,3155 c -0,266 -0,923 b
Wald test of joint significance: 54525,01 0,0000 74640,04 0,0000 2805,97 0,0000 1133,38 0,0000 2.315,61 0,0000 3.214,26 0,0000
Sargan test: 67,16 0,5400 73,28 0,3710 65,31 0,6360 64,61 0,6600 63,70 0,6890 62,93 0,7130
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-4,50 0,0000 -4,49 0,0000 -4,50 0,0000 -4,47 0,0000 -4,48 0,0000 -4,47 0,0000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,95 0,3400 -0,96 0,3390 -1,00 0,3180 -0,94 0,3460 -0,93 0,3510 -0,90 0,3660
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
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Constant 0,8882 a 0,3695 a 1,1798 a 0,2729 a 1,4543 a 1,0092 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,0071 0,0860 a 0,0560 0,1432 a 0,1177 b -0,0355
Current earnings/Total assets -0,4155 a -0,4173 a -0,2370 a -0,4080 a -0,2850 a -0,2787 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0109 a 0,0210 a -0,0350 a 0,0265 a -0,0487 a -0,0165 b
Banks Development -0,3011 a -0,2934 a -0,2059 a -0,2827 a -0,1823 b -0,2587 a
Bonds Development -0,4812 a -0,5771 a -0,3702 a -0,5695 a -0,3564 a -0,4202 a
err (A) -0,0084 -0,2589 0,1296 -0,4777 a -0,5242 a -0,4328 a
Capital account restrictions -0,2015 a -0,1827 a -0,2177 a -0,1777 a -0,2395 a -0,2024 a
err specific group effect (B) -0,5979 a -0,2677 c -1,0727 a 0,3853 1,3974 a 0,5776 c
Constant for the group 0,0872 a 0,0963 a 0,1331 a -0,1111 a -0,1401 a -0,1400 b
err net group effect (A+B) -0,6063 a -0,5266 a -0,9431 a -0,0924 0,8732 a 0,1448
Wald test of joint significance: 656,19 0,0000 2485,17 0,0000 212,23 0,0000 6916,01 0,0000 453,62 0,0000 219,83 0,0000
Sargan test: 66,48 0,5970 64,73 0,6560 62,31 0,2930 63,61 0,6920 62,70 0,2810 63,46 0,2590
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-4,48 0,0000 -4,45 0,0000 -4,43 0,0000 -4,48 0,0000 -4,45 0,0000 -4,44 0,0000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,95 0,3440 -0,91 0,3610 -0,90 0,3660 -0,91 0,3660 -0,91 0,3640 -0,91 0,3640
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
0,16 0,8740 0,11 0,9100 0,16 0,8700 0,11 0,9160 0,18 0,8600 0,14 0,8890
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%27
Table 6. Dependent Variable: Financial Expenditures





securities abroad 4. Small firms 5. Medium size 6. Large firms












Constant 0,2045 a 0,2722 a 0,2441 a 0,3274 a 0,2549 a 0,0786 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0055 a -0,0085 a -0,0071 a -0,0087 a -0,0061 a -0,0003
Leverage 0,0394 a 0,0428 a 0,0419 a 0,0397 a 0,0365 a 0,0568 a
Borrowing int rate, domestic (A) 0,2305 a 0,2577 a 0,3143 a 0,2943 a 0,1313 a 0,2804 a
Restrictions on capital outflows
(index)
-0,0101 a -0,0167 a -0,0164 a -0,0213 a -0,0125 a -0,0003
Borrowing int rate, external (B) 0,0344 a -0,0120 0,0168 -0,0354 b 0,0257 b 0,0826 a
Financial liberalization Index -0,0859 a -0,1087 a -0,1051 a -0,1449 a -0,1163 a -0,0648 a
Constant for the group 0,0165 b 0,0866 a -0,0227 a -0,0209 a 0,0274 a
Borrowing rate (domestic) group
specific effect (C)
-0,0697 -0,7985 a -0,2116 a 0,3956 a -0,2888 a
Borrowing int rate (external) group
Specific effect (D)
0,0880 a 0,1499 a 0,1928 a -0,0452 -0,0687 a
Borrowing cost, domestic, net
Effect for the group (A+C)
0,1880 a -0,4842 a 0,0828 0,5268 b -0,0084
Borrowing cost, external, net
Effect for the group (B+D)
0,0760 a 0,1668 a 0,1574 a -0,0195 0,0139
Wald test of joint significance: 273,19 0,0000 698,94 0,0000 1153,18 0,0000 790,88 0,0000 646,66 0,0000 527,59 0,0000
Sargan test: 54,54 0,5300 62,50 0,3200 54,75 0,5970 64,20 0,2680 57,67 0,4880 59,81 0,4100
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-3,09 0,0020 -3,10 0,0020 -3,16 0,0020 -3,07 0,0020 -3,06 0,0020 -3,13 0,0020
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,49 0,6270 -0,45 0,6500 -0,56 0,5760 -0,44 0,6630 -0,45 0,6500 -0,59 0,5530
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,70 0,4840 -0,69 0,4920 -0,71 0,4780 -0,76 0,4490 -0,67 0,5060 -0,67 0,504028
Table 6. Dependent Variable: Financial Expenditures (cont’d)
Financial Expenditures 7. Tradable
sector
8. Primary
sector 9. Manufacture 10. Utilities 11. Services 12. Transportation












Constant 0,2200 a 0,2292 a 0,2495 a 0,1644 a 0,2783 a 0,1642 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0065 a -0,0059 a -0,0070 a -0,0040 a -0,0081 a -0,0028 a
Leverage 0,0466 a 0,0415 a 0,0436 a 0,0496 a 0,0445 a 0,0275 a
Borrowing int rate, domestic (A) 0,1902 a 0,1882 a 0,2086 a 0,2012 a 0,2234 a 0,2169 a
Restrictions on capital outflows
(index)
-0,0122 a -0,0118 a -0,0139 a -0,0070 a -0,0161 a -0,0057 b
Borrowing int rate, external (B) 0,0354 b 0,0464 a 0,0001 0,0363 a 0,0419 b 0,0173
Financial liberalization Index -0,0822 a -0,1028 a -0,1049 a -0,0764 a -0,1120 a -0,0866 a
Constant for the group -0,0039 -0,0038 -0,0013 0,0192 a -0,0243 a -0,0038
Borrowing rate (domestic) group
specific effect (C)
0,0558 0,1377 0,0332 -0,0758 0,0573 -0,1242 c
Borrowing int rate (external)
group specific effect (D)
0,0052 -0,0900 b 0,0807 b -0,0066 -0,0113 -0,1059 a
Borrowing cost, domestic, net
effect for the group (A+C)
0,2460 b 0,3259 a 0,2418 a 0,1254 b 0,2807 a 0,0928
Borrowing cost, external, net
effect for the group (B+D)
0,0406 a -0,0436 0,0809 a 0,0297 0,0305 -0,0886 a
Wald test of joint significance: 336,98 0,0000 818,83 0,0000 665,59 0,0000 448,32 0,0000 473,18 0,0000 563,10 0,0000
Sargan test: 57,03 0,5120 56,23 0,5410 58,38 0,4610 60,17 0,3970 60,54 0,3840 49,84 0,7060
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-3,09 0,0020 -3,03 0,0020 -3,09 0,0020 -3,11 0,0020 -3,08 0,0020 -3,09 0,0020
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,50 0,6210 -0,46 0,6450 -0,50 0,6150 -0,51 0,6090 -0,47 0,6350 -0,48 0,6320
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,71 0,4770 -0,71 0,4800 -0,71 0,4770 -0,69 0,4910 -0,70 0,4860 -0,68 0,4940
Notes
a = sign. at 1%
b = sig.  at 5%
c = sig. at 10%29





Tradable Sector Primary sector Manufacture Utilities Other services Transportation Financial sector TOTAL
Large 21 9 19 4 12 9 1 4 0 30
Medium size 10 0 17 7 10 3 2 0 1 23
Small 5 0 7 2 5 3 8 0 2 20
TOTAL 36 9 43 13 27 15 11 4 3 73
Economic conglomerates 36 8 22 7 13 10 4 2 0 36
Non-economic conglomerates 0 1 21 6 14 5 7 2 3 37
TOTAL 36 9 43 13 27 15 11 4 3 73
Issue ADR & Bonds abroad 8 9 7 1 5 2 0 1 0 9
Non-issue ADR & Bonds abroad 28 0 36 12 22 13 11 3 3 64
TOTAL 36 9 43 13 27 15 11 4 3 73
Primary sector 7 1 13 13 0 0 0 0 0 13
Manufacture 13 5 27 0 27 0 0 0 0 27
Utilities 10 2 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 15
Other services 4 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 11
Transportation 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
Financial sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
TOTAL 36 9 43 13 27 15 11 4 3 73
Tradable Sector 22 7 43 13 27 0 0 3 0 43
Non-tradable Sector 14 2 0 0 0 15 11 1 3 30
















Full sample 1168 0,057 0,604 0,299 0,429 0,067 0,178 0,123
1986 73 0,040 0,598 0,325 0,464 0,097 0,045 0,124
1987 73 0,059 0,627 0,322 0,474 0,096 0,082 0,132
1988 73 0,058 0,665 0,298 0,484 0,085 0,140 0,131
1989 73 0,069 0,704 0,314 0,470 0,098 0,152 0,149
1990 73 0,078 0,668 0,303 0,470 0,075 0,160 0,139
1991 73 0,054 0,626 0,281 0,457 0,096 0,199 0,114
1992 73 0,057 0,654 0,280 0,437 0,097 0,216 0,131
1993 73 0,058 0,641 0,276 0,431 0,071 0,213 0,123
1994 73 0,058 0,618 0,265 0,424 0,063 0,223 0,114
1995 73 0,055 0,629 0,269 0,418 0,062 0,226 0,131
1996 73 0,057 0,600 0,279 0,415 0,053 0,229 0,115
1997 73 0,057 0,555 0,287 0,401 0,054 0,235 0,110
1998 73 0,058 0,520 0,307 0,414 0,036 0,210 0,104
1999 73 0,052 0,478 0,325 0,383 0,028 0,182 0,104
2000 73 0,060 0,538 0,322 0,363 0,031 0,173 0,114























 URR Tax Rate (t), Index of Foreign Investment Permanence Requirements (accr),  
Index of Controls on Capital Issues (acci), and Index of Other Administrative Controls 





Source: Gallego et al. (2002)32
Figure 2:




























Source: Gallego et al. (2002)33
ANNEX 1: VARIABLES DEFINITION AND SOURCES
Variable name Definition Source
Dependent variable
Leverage (Total debt)t/(Total assets) t Computed from firms’
financial statements
Retained earnings (Retained earnings)t/(Total assets)t Computed from firms’
financial statements




















(Fixed assets)t / (total assets)t Computed from firms’
financial statements
Current earnings/Total
assets = return on assets
(Total earnings)t / 0.5[(total assets)t+(total assets)t-1 (Pt/Pt-1)] Computed from firms’
financial statements
Nat Log total assets Natural log of total assets t Computed from firms’
financial statements
B. Macro variables
Banks Development (Banks’ total assets)t / 0.5[GDPt+GDPt-1 (Pt / Pt-1)] Authors’ calculations
Bonds Development (Stock of bonds)t / 0.5[GDPt+GDPt-1 (Pt / Pt-1)] IFC and authors’ calculations
Banks and Bonds
Development
[(Banks’ total assets)t + (Stock of bonds)t]/ 0.5[GDPt+GDPt-1
(Pt / Pt-1)]
IFC and authors’ calculations
Stock Mkt. Capitalization Stock Mkt. Capitalization t / 0.5[GDP t + GDP t-1 (Pt/Pt-1)]
Borrowing interest rate,
domestic
Borrowing real (CPI indexed) rate for operations from 90 to
365 days maturity
Central Bank of Chile
Borrowing interest rate,
external
LIBOR + r (country risk) + err Authors’ calculations
Financial liberalization
Index
Index measuring the degree and extent of financial
repression (an increase means more liberalization)




Index measuring the extent and severity of existing
restrictions on capital outflows  (remittances and other
administrative controls); an increase means a more restrictive
environment
Gallego et al. (2002)
Capital account
restrictions
Index measuring the extent and severity of existing
restrictions on both inflows and outflows  (remittances,
minimum periods of stay, issuance of paper –equity and
bonds– abroad, etc.); an increase means a more restrictive
environment
Gallego et al. (2002)
Err Effective (financial) cost of the reserve requirement (urr); an
increase means a higher effective tax
Gallego et al. (2002)34
ANNEX 2: Regressions controlling for taxes
Dependent Variable: Leverage Retained Earnings Capital asset ratio
Base regression With taxes Base regression With taxes Base regression With taxes
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant -0,1801 b -0,197 b -0,6009 a -0,563 a 1,5515 a 1,576 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,1775 a 0,181 a -0,2319 a -0,248 a 0,1207 a 0,131 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,1698 a -0,199 a 0,6248 a 0,636 a -0,4751 a -0,488 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0232 a 0,024 a 0,0549 a 0,054 a -0,0662 a -0,068 a
Banks Development 0,1406 a 0,140 a -0,2173 a -0,284 a 0,1001 a 0,113 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization -0,0665 a -0,061 a 0,0357 a 0,033 a 0,0284 a 0,028 a
Err (A) -0,3029 a -0,275 a 0,4697 a 0,486 a -0,3080 a -0,324 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0082 0,021 b 0,0322 a 0,018 c -0,0227 c -0,026 b
Taxes -0,039 c 0,067 b -0,013
Wald test of joint significance: 661,97 0,0000 551,881 0,000 4012,72 0,0000 18371,312 0,000 3057,34 0,0000 54410,423 0,000
Sargan test: 70,26 0,8190 70,075 0,843 64,36 0,8830 65,020 0,888 67,11 0,8270 67,757 0,834
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-2,02 0,0430 -2,026 0,043 1,74 0,0810 1,721 0,085 -0,85 0,3980 0,847 0,397
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,39 0,6960 -0,452 0,651 1,91 0,0560 1,898 0,058 1,64 0,1000 1,644 0,100
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
1,10 0,2710 1,153 0,249 0,94 0,3460 0,952 0,341 0,32 0,7490 0,303 0,762
Notes: a = significant at 1%;  b = significant at 5%;  c = significant at 10%35
ANNEX 3: GMM System Estimation vs. other simpler techniques
Dependent Variable: Leverage Retained Earnings
GMM System OLS GMM Levels GMM System OLS GMM Levels
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant -0,1801 b -0,156 -0,105 -0,6009 a -0,018 -0,274 c
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,1775 a 0,248 a 0,306 a -0,2319 a -0,479 a -0,457 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,1698 a 0,083 0,044 0,6248 a 1,331 a 1,624 a
Nat Log total assets 0,0232 a 0,015 c 0,010 b 0,0549 a 0,014 0,024 a
Banks Development 0,1406 a 0,258 b 0,229 a -0,2173 a 0,023 0,142 b
Stock Mkt. Capitalization -0,0665 a -0,051 -0,047 a 0,0357 a 0,070 b 0,093 a
err (A) -0,3029 a -0,322 -0,301 a 0,4697 a 0,715 b 0,507 a
Capital account restrictions 0,0082 0,004 0,007 0,0322 a 0,024 0,054 b
Wald test of joint significance: 661,97 0,0000 46,552 0,000 127,824 0,000 4012,72 0,0000 83,834 0,000 473,020 0,000
Sargan test: 70,26 0,8190 45,015 0,235 64,36 0,8830 47,508 0,165
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-2,02 0,0430 5,784 0,000 5,876 0,000 1,74 0,0810 2,419 0,016 2,553 0,011
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,39 0,6960 5,508 0,000 5,591 0,000 1,91 0,0560 2,304 0,021 2,422 0,015
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
1,10 0,2710 5,256 0,000 5,339 0,000 0,94 0,3460 2,211 0,027 2,328 0,020
Dependent Variable: Capital Asset Ratio
GMM System OLS GMM Levels
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant 1,5515 a 1,174 a 1,406 a
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,1207 a 0,232 0,187 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,4751 a -1,414 a -1,523 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0662 a -0,029 -0,041 a
Banks Development 0,1001 a -0,281 -0,289 a
Stock Mkt. Capitalization 0,0284 a -0,019 -0,031
err (A) -0,3080 a -0,392 -0,329 b
Capital account restrictions -0,0227 c -0,028 -0,022
Wald test of joint significance: 3057,34 0,0000 58,637 0,000 398,505 0,000
Sargan test: 67,11 0,8270 43,504 0,286
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-0,85 0,3980 2,203 0,028 2,338 0,019
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
1,64 0,1000 2,099 0,036 2,226 0,026
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
0,32 0,7490 2,003 0,045 2,133 0,033
Notes: a = significant at 1%;  b = significant at 5%;  c = significant at 10%36
ANNEX 3: GMM System Estimation vs. other simpler techniques (cont’d)
Dependent Variable: ST debt over total debt
GMM System OLS GMM Levels
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant 2,4568 a 2,303 a 2,398 a
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,2543 a -0,407 a -0,492 a
Current earnings/Total assets 0,2989 a 0,245 0,187
Nat Log total assets -0,0967 a -0,078 a -0,089 a
Banks and Bonds Development -0,1018 a -0,203 -0,080
err (A) 0,4279 a 0,330 0,515 a
Capital account restrictions -0,0625 a -0,065 -0,026
Wald test of joint significance: 1642,16 0,0000 148,320 0,000 318,943 0,000
Sargan test: 62,65 0,6600 45,513 0,219
Test for first-order serial
correlation:
-3,77 0,0000 6,245 0,000 6,332 0,000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,05 0,9640 5,688 0,000 5,761 0,000
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,61 0,5430 5,116 0,000 5,162 0,000
Notes: a = significant at 1%;  b = significant at 5%;  c = significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: ST financial over total ST debt
GMM System OLS GMM Levels
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant 0,9012 a 0,518 b 0,362 b
Fixed assets/Total assets -0,0287 0,128 0,174 a
Current earnings/Total assets -0,4183 a -0,425 b -0,455 a
Nat Log total assets -0,0066 0,011 0,010
Banks Development -0,3289 a -0,486 b -0,213 b
Bonds Development -0,4881 a -0,235 -0,316 a
err (A) -0,3499 a -0,496 -0,108
Capital account restrictions -0,2051 a -0,180 a -0,152 a
Wald test of joint significance: 54525,01 0,0000 22,959 0,002 84,096 0,000
Sargan test: 67,16 0,5400 42,045 0,340
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-4,50 0,0000 6,193 0,000 6,364 0,000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,95 0,3400 5,894 0,000 6,058 0,000
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
0,14 0,8860 5,518 0,000 5,636 0,000
Notes: a = significant at 1%;  b = significant at 5%;  c = significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: Financial Expenditures
GMM System OLS GMM Levels
Variable Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev Coefficient Mg sig lev
Constant 0,2045 a 0,038 0,025
Nat Log total assets -0,0055 a 0,002 0,003 a
Leverage 0,0394 a 0,035 b 0,029 b
Borrowing int rate, domestic 0,2305 a 0,225 a 0,209 a
Restrictions on capital outflows
(index)
-0,0101 a 0,009 0,008
Borrowing int rate, external 0,0344 a -0,001 -0,001
Financial liberalization Index -0,0859 a -0,056 -0,057
Wald test of joint significance: 273,19 0,0000 24,035 0,001 43,222 0,000
Sargan test: 54,54 0,5300 25,360 0,499
Test for  first-order serial
correlation:
-3,09 0,0020 5,677 0,000 5,733 0,000
Test for second-order serial
correlation:
-0,49 0,6270 5,575 0,000 5,653 0,000
Test for third-order serial
correlation:
-0,70 0,4840 5,049 0,000 5,156 0,000
Notes: a = significant at 1%;  b = significant at 5%;  c = significant at 10%Documentos de Trabajo
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